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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12,817 
Appeal from the Order of the District Court 
in post-judgment contempt proceedings dismissing 
plaintiffs and appellants' Amended Petition For 
1 
Order To Show Cause di1·ectecl against defendant 
and respondent M. Kenneth White and denying the 
i·elief sought by said appellants therein. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court issued an Order To Show Cause 
di1·ected against defendant M. Kenneth White based 
upon the Amended Petition of plaintiffs, ordering 
him to appea1· and show cause why he should not be 
punished for contempt for an alleged violation of the 
Decree made and entered on the 1st day of June, 
1965· A hearing was held, and based upon the evi-
dence presented at the hearing the trial court found 
that defendant M. Kenneth White did not violate the 
terms of its Decree dated June 1, 1965 and that said 
defendant was not guilty of contempt and, accord-
ingly, entered its Order dismissing plaintiffs' 
Amended Petition For Order To Show Cause and 
denying the relief sought therein. The narrow issue 
on this appeal is whether there is any substantial evi-
dence to support the Findings of the trial court. If 
so, the Order of the trial court must be affirmed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent M. Kenneth White seeks to affirm 
the Order made and entered by the trial court dis- ' 
missing appellants' Amended Petition For Order To 
Show Cause and denying the relief sought therein. 
Hereafter plaintiffs and appellants will be collective-
ly referred to as "Fairfield" and defendant and re-
spondent M. Kenneth White will be referred to as 
"White." 
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--
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
White cannot agree with Fairfield's Statement 
Of Facts fo1· two basic reasons: 
(1) It is impregnated with what the trial court 
found or did not find in its 1965 Findings Of 
Fact and is but a rehash of past history, now 
irrelevant to this proceeding since the 1965 De-
cree is clear and unambiguous; and 
(2) It carefully selects the post 1965 facts as to the 
flows of the Fairfield Springs and the opera-
tion of White's well most favorable to Fairfield, 
contrary to the cardinal rule on appellant re-
view. 
And so White makes the following brief Statement 
Of Facts, which are the relevant facts on this appeal. 
The discharge of the Fairfield Springs was 
measured by Fairfield's representatives during the 
period from May, 1966 through September, 1970 
(Exh. 1; Tr. 13). Those measurements were plotted 
as hydrographs, which do not include the 0.12 second 
foot of water flowing from White's replacement well 
into either of Fairfield's ditches (Exhs. 2, 5; Tr. 17). 
White did not pump either of his irriga:tion wells in 
1965 (Tr. 42) or in 1966 (R. 12A). He pumped one 
well intermittently from October 24, 1967 until Aug-
ust 10, 1970 (R. 12, 12A; Tr. 18). During the en-
tire period of pumping the total discharge of the 
Fairfield Springs, as augmented by the 0.12 second 
foot flowing from White's replacement well into 
3 
Fairfield's ditches, did not fall below 4.10 cfs with-
in the tolerance of the accuracy of the measurements 
( Exhs. 1, 2, 5; Tr. 35, 42). Likewise, in each year 
during which White pumped his well the discharge 
of the Fairfield Springs, as augmented by the flow 
of the White replacement well, exceeded 1600 acre 
feet during the period April 20 to October 20 of each 
year (Exh. 6; Tr. 41, 42). White's replacement well 
was not pumped during the post-judgment period 
1 
but flowed 0.12 second foot continuously (Tr. 35) 
and was discharged into Fairfield's ditches (Tr. 17). 
Based upon the foregoing facts, the trial court found 
that White did not violate the provisions of the De-
cree made and entered herein on the 1st day of June, ' 
1965 and that he was not guilty of contempt. There-
upon the trial court entered its Order dismissing 
Fairfield's Amended Petition For Order To Show 
Cause and denied the relief sought therein (R. 16). 
From such Order Fairfield filed its Notice Of Appeal 
herein (R. 19). 
POINT I. 
THE DECREE MADE AND ENTERED HERE-
IN ON THE lST DAY OF JUNE, 1965 IS CLEAR 
AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND THE RELIEF 
SOUGHT BY FAIRFIELD HEREIN SEEKS TO 
MODIFY AND CHANGE THE MEANING OF 
SAID DECREE. 
The crux of this post-judgment proceeding is 
whether White violated that provision of paragraph 
4 (a) of the 1965 Decree ( R. 4) which provides as 
follows: 
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"4. That the defendant White should be 
and he is hereby enjoined from producing any 
water from his two large irrigation wells 
which were drilled under Applications Nos. 
22928 and 22826, except upon condition that 
he comply with the following replacement or-
der: 
" (a) That the irrigation water from Fair-
field Springs be maintained at a 
minimum flow of 4.10 cubic feet per 
second through April 20th to Octo-
ber 20th of each year, and that the 
average flow be such as to yield not 
less than 1600 acre feet during said 
season, ... " 
The foregoing provision is clear and unambiguous 
and means exactly what it says. So long as the min-
imum flow of the Fairfield Springs is maintained at 
4.10 cfs or above and the average flow thereof during 
the April 20 to October 20 period is such as to yield 
1600 acre feet, White is entitled to operate either or 
both of his irrigation wells. If either condition is not 
satisfied he is enjoined from operating his wells ex-
cept upon the condition that he replaces water to the 
Fairfield Springs to satisfy those conditions. And so 
we need only to look to the record of the evidence re-
ceived at the post-judgment hearing to determine 
whether there is any substantial evidence to show 
that both conditions were satisfied during the post-
judgment periods when White operated his well. If 
so, the decision of the trial court must be affirmed· 
Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 
(1961). 
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We submit that the evidence clearly establishes 
that both conditions were satisfied. Thus during the 
entire period when White intermittently operated his 
well the total discharge of the Fairfield Springs, as 
augmented by the 0.12 cfs of water from his replace-
ment well into Fairfield's ditches, did not fall below 
4.10 cfs within the tolerance of the accuracy of the 
measurements (Exhs. 1, 2, 5; Tr. 42). This was ad-
mitted by Fairfield's expert witness Lawrence (Tr. 
1 
35) and is effectively conceded by Fairfield on page 
5 of its Brief. Likewise in each year during which 
White intermittently operated his well the total dis-
charge of the Fairfield Springs, as augmented by the 
flow of White's replacement well, exceeded 1600 acre 1 
feet during the period April 20 to October 20 (Exh. 
6; Tr. 41, 42). Fairfield offered no evidence to the 
contrary, and nowhere in Fairfield's Brief does it 
contend otherwise. That being so, it follows that 
White did not violate the foregoing provisions of the 
1965 Decree, nor was he guilty of contempt as the 1 
trial court properly and correctly so found. It is just 
that simple, and that should end the matter in this 
Court. 
However, Fairfield does not confine its argu-
ment to the evidence presented at the post-judgment 
1 
hearing nor to the language of the 1965 Decree, as 
we say it must. Rather, Fairfield engages in a 
lengthy discourse on what the trial court found or 
did not find in its 1965 Findings Of Fact and argues 
therefrom that Fairfield is the owner of all of the 
water which the Fairfield Springs would produce 
6 
but for the pumping of White's well, and that as a 
condition to White's operating his well he must re-
place every drop of water which the Fairfield Springs 
would have otherwise produced· This Fairfield ar-
gues at length without regard to the clear and unam-
biguous language of paragrph 4 (a) of the Decree. 
We say that Fairfield's whole argument is an abor-
tive attempt to indirectly modify the 1965 Decree 
and then urge a violation thereof under Fairfield's 
modified version. This the trial court would not per-
mit Fairfield to do, and correctly so. That is the sum 
and substance of this appeal. 
Although we are tempted to ignore Fairfield's 
argument as being wholly irrelevant and here end the 
dialogue, we feel constrained to point up the fallacy 
of it all. Thus at the outset of the post-judgment 
hearing in the court below counsel for Fairfield ad-
vised the court that it was asking for the further re-
lief of defining the quantity of water Fairfield was 
entitled to take and that it was not going to press for 
a contempt citation (Tr. 5). The trial court became 
concerned with what relief Fairfield there was really 
seeking and reiterated that the only question for the 
court to determine was whether there had been a vio-
lation of the Decree (Tr. 7, 8, 10). In response to 
the query of the trial court as to whether Fairfield 
was asking for a modification of the Decree, counsel 
for Fairfield advised that it was not seeking a mod-
ification but just a further '''refinement" of some-
thing the Decree didn't decide (Tr. 8, 9, 10). 
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The so-called "refinement" which Fairfield 
there sought and which it now urges is that White 
should not be permitted to pump one drop of water 
unless he simultaneously replaces some unascertain-
able quantity of water to Fairfield without regard to 
whether the Fairfield Springs are producing 4.1 cfs, 
6 cfs or 10 cfs or whether Fairfield can beneficially 
use all of the waters emanating therefrom. That is 
a far cry from what paragraph 4 (a) of the 1965 
Decree says. Such refinement would not only mod-
ify the 1965 Decree but would render paragraph 
4 (a) thereof a nullity. 
The irony of it all is exemplified by comparing 
the position taken by Fairfield in the prior appeal • 
(Case No. 10,488) with its position in this post-
judgment proceeding. In the prior appeal White 
challenged the Findings of the trial court fixing the 
constant minimum flow of the Fairfield Springs at 
4.10 cfs and a yield therefrom of 1600 acre feet dur-
ing the irrigation season as the foundation of the ' 
trial court's replacement order. In reply thereto, 
Fairfield on page 3 of its p:rior Brief stated its Point 
I. B as follows: 
"B. The court properly ordered appel- • 
lant to add sufficient water to the spring to 
maintain the flow at 4.10 c.f.s. and to deliver 
1600 acre feet per year." 
In response to White's challenge to the finding of the 
trial court that the Fairfield Springs had ever pro- . 
duced 6 cfs, Fairfield stated on page 5 of its prior 
Brief as follows: 
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"This however, is really an argument 
about an immaterial point. The court didn't 
order Appellant to replace 6 c.f.s., either as a 
rate of flow nor in connection with the total 
quantity. The court's order required only 4.10 
c.f .s. minimum, and 1,600 acre feet - a quan-
tity which could be delivered with an average 
flow of 4.37 c.f.s." 
And in response to White's challenge to the 1600 acre 
feet, Fairfield stated as one of its sub-points on par-
agraph 14 of its prior Brief as follows: 
7. The court correctly held that Respon-
dents were entitled to receive 1,600 acre feet 
during their 183 day irrigation season." 
In its prior opin'ion (Fairfield Irrigation Com-
pany v. White, 18 Utah 2d 93, 416 P.2d 641) this 
Court stated on page 95 of the Utah Reports as fol-
lows: 
"After a trial, the court entered a decree 
enjoining White from pumping his wells ex-
cept upon specified conditions and prescribing 
replacement of water necessary to assure the 
plaintiffs the water they are entitled to under 
their prior claims to the water of Fairfield 
S . " prmgs; ... 
This Court then went on to affirm the conditions im-
posed by the 1965 Decree to assure Fairfield of the 
waters to which it and they are entitled. 
After having successfully sustained the 4.10 cfs 
and 1600 acre feet conditions in the prior appeal, 
Fairfield now comes back via a post-judgment pro-
ceeding and seeks to abrogate those conditions by 
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expanding upon its adjudicated rights and by im-
posing further limitations and restrictions on 
White's rights. It now seeks to prohibit White from 
pumping a single drop of wa:ter by means of his wells 
unless he replaces some 'imaginary quantity which 
the Fairfield Springs w o u 1 d have theoretically 
yielded without his pumping, whether it be 5 cfs, 6 
cfs, 7 cfs or, we suppose, 50 cfs. We say that was 
all settled in the 1965 Decree, as affirmed by this 
Court in 1966, and the conditions imposed under par-
agraph 4 (a) are those finally adjudicated necessary 
to assure Fairfield the waters to which it and they 
are entitled. Those conditions are res judicata and 
the law of the case and are equally binding on Fair-
field as they are on White. They cannot be altered, 
changed, modified or refined in this post-judgment 
proceeding as Fairfield seeks to do. Were that not 
so this litigation would never end. 
In Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 
701 (1968) this Court stated the principle here con-
trolling on page 335 of the Utah Reports as follows: 
"- .. Litigation must be put to an end, 
and it is the function of a final judgment to do 
just that. A judgment is the final considera-
tion and determination of a court on matters 
submitted to it in an action or proceeding. ( 49 
C.J.S. Judgments Sec. 1) 
"If a judgment can mean one thing one 
day and something else on another day, there 
would be no reason to suppose that the litiga-
tion had been set at rest. The same must be 
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said if the judgment can mean one thing to one 
judge and something else to another judge. All 
are bound by the original language 'USed, and 
all ought to interpret the language the same 
way. No court should express an opinion of 
what the judgment means until the judgment 
is called into question by some factual situa-
tion relating thereto. The judge who tried the 
case and who ought to know what he meant to 
say, after the time for appeal, etc., has passed 
cannot any more change or cancel one word of 
the judgment than can any other judge." (Em-
phasis ours.) 
Here the judge who tried the case and who ought to 
know what he meant to say found in this post-judg-
ment proceeding that White did not violate the De-
cree and denied the relief sought by Fairfield. To 
do otherwise would require a cancellation of para-
graph 4 (a) of theDecree, which could not be done in 
the court below and, we respectfully submit, cannot 
be done on this appeal. 
While we have no quarrel with the general rule 
urged under Point II of Fairfield's Brie! that a de-
cree should be construed as a whole so as to give 
meaning to all of its terms, we do take issue with the 
way Fairfield goes about attempting to construe the 
Decree and with the conclusions it reaches therefrom. 
Nowhere in Appellant's Brief does it urge that 
the 1965 Decree is ambiguous. We say that the De-
cree is clear and unambiguous and the rule of inter-
pretation to be here employed is the rule applicable 
to an unambiguous judgment. In 46 Am· Jur. 2d, 
11 
Sec. 72 the rule is stated on page 363 thereof as fol-
lows: 
" ... If, on the other hand, the judgment 
is not ambiguous or uncertain, the parol evi-
dence rule applies, and the written judgment 
should be accepted at i'ts face value and with-
out speculating as to the reasoning employed 
in reaching the particular result." 
Where a judgment is clear and unambiguous, neither 
pleadings, findings of fact nor verdict may be resort-
ed to to change its meaning. Chronister v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., (N.M.), 381 P.2d 673 (1963); 
Callanv.Callan (Wash.),468P.2d456 (1970). And 
as stated in 46 Am· Jur. 2d, Sec. 76, page 365 thereof: 
''If, however, a judgment is not ambigu-
ous and leaves nothing for interpretation, 
there is no need to refer to the pleadings or 
other parts of the record. It is clear that if a 
finding is inconsistent with the judgment 
proper or decretal part of the judgment, the 
latter must control." (Emphasis ours.) 
Nowhere in Fairfield's Brief does it point up 
any ambiguity in the Decree which would justify its 
resort to the Findings Of Fact under the accepted 
rules of construction. Yet in Point I of its argument, 
under the guise of attempting to construe the Find-
ings and Decree as a harmonious whole, it quotes in 
whole or in part or makes some reference to Findings 
Nos. 1, 2, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17 and 26. That we say 
is but a rehash of past history settled a long time ago 
and has no part in this appeal. 
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The sum and substance of Fairfield's rehash of 
the 1965 Findings, as we view it, is 
( 1) that Fairfield owns all of the waters emanating 
from the Fairfield Springs, without limitation; 
(2) that White's irrigation wells interfere with the 
flow of the Fairfield Springs; and 
(3) that White is not entitled to pump a single drop 
of water unless he simultaneously replaces drop 
by drop the water which but for his pumping 
would have flowed from the Fairfield Springs. 
As to ( 1) above, we agree that the 1965 Decree 
awards Fairfield the right to the use of all of the 
waters emanating from the Fairfield Springs which 
it can beneficially use. The 1600 acre feet gives 
Fairfield a duty of 3.5 acre feet per acre for its 454 
acres of land during the irrigation season, which we 
believe is reasonable. In addition thereto Fairfield 
gets another 2.9 acre feet per acre during the non-
irrigation season for 280 out of the 454 acres, which 
White raised in the prior appeal as being unreason-
able but which was affirmed by this Court. 'The pos-
ition of Fairfield now is that as against White and 
all junior appropriators from the basin it owns all 
of the waters of the Fairfield Springs without regard 
to duty or the other limitations set forth in the De-
cree. Paragraph 4 (a) of the Decree fixed the condi-
tions under which White can pump and assures Fair-
field the waters to which it is entitled. Fairfield has 
an absolute guarantee of a minimum flow of 4.1 cfs 
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and a yield of 1600 acre feet during the irrigation 
season, and if nature won't provide it White must 
if he wants to pump either of his irrigation wells. 
We say that Fairfield's position here is untenable 
since it hangs on paragraph 1 of the Decree to the 
exclusion of the remainder of the Decree and thereby 
violates the very principle it so strenuously argues 
for under its Point II. 
As to ( 2) above, one would think that Fairfield 
has to persuade this Court all over again that the 
pumping of the White irrigation wells interferes with 
the flow of the Fairfield Springs· That was settled 
back in 1965 and needs not be rehashed here. Fair-
field repeatedly argues that the Decree never gave 
White any interest in the Fairfield Springs and 
charges over and over again that White has taken 
"our water." The fallacy of it all is that White does 
not divert water directly from the Fairfield Springs 
after the waters therefrom emanate from the under-
ground source. Rather, White diverts water from 
the inter-connected underground sources some two 
miles away. Fairfield does not have a monopoly on 
the entire underground source. It is public water, 
and so long as Fairfield's rights are protected in ac-
cordance with the Decree White as a junior appropri-
ator is entitled to divert water for his use. The con-
ditions of the Decree have been maintained and Fair-
field has received the water to which it is entitled. 
As to ( 3) above, Fairfield obviously cannot get 
that meaning out of paragraph 4 (a) of the Decree. 
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What Fairfield is really attempting to do is to use 
Finding No. 26 'to change the plain language and 
meaning of paragraph 4 (a) of the Decree. Thus on 
page 12 of its Brief Fairfield emphasizes that Find-
ing No. 26 says in substance that White should be en-
joined from pumping his irrigation wells at any time 
during any season except upon the condition that the 
waters of Fairfield be fully replaced with the same 
quantity of water. Yet on page 14 of Fairfield's 
Brief it acknowledges that the Decree (paragraph 
4 (a) ) does not include that part of the language of 
Finding No. 26. If there is any inconsistency be-
tween the language of Finding No. 26 and paragraph 
4 (a) of the Decree, and we say there is not, then par-
agraph 4 (a) of the Decree must control. Under the 
general rule of construction it is clear that if a find-
ing is inconsistent with the judgment proper or a de-
cretal part of the judgment the latter must control. 
46 Am. Jur· 2d, Judgments, Section 76, page 365. 
We do not believe that Finding No. 26 is incon-
sistent with paragraph 4 (a) of the Decree. Thus the 
first paragraph of Finding No. 26 is but a general 
statement of the necessity for replacement as a condi-
tion to White's operating his wells, which relates to 
all plaintiffs including those individual plaintiffs 
who have flowing wells. The last sentence thereof ex-
pressly makes the sub-paragraphs which follow the 
specific conditions of replacement, which are identi-
cal with the sub-paragraphs of paragraph 4 of the 
Decree. The first sentence of paragraph 4 of the De-
15 
cree is the force by which White is enjoined and is 
specific, clear and unambiguous. To adopt the same 
language therein as is contained in the first para-
graph of Finding No. 26 would make it open-€nded 
and ambiguous and the specific subparagraphs which 
follow of necessity would qualify and limit the pre-
ceding general language ; otherwise the Decree would 
fail for vagueness. There is simply no way by which 
Fairfield can distort paragraph 4 (a) of the Decree 
to support its contention even if the rules of construc-
tion would permit it, which they do not. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING 
OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT WHITE DID 
NOT VIOLATE THE 1965 DECREE, AND ITS 
ORDER MUST BE AFFIRMED. 
Fairfield carefully selects those facts from the 
evidence presented at the post-judgment hearing 
most favorable to it and argues therefrom that White 
has taken substantial quantities of ''their" water 
contrary to the spirit and intent of the 1965 Decree. 
It unfairly refers to the White replacement well as 
"leaking" 0.12 cfs when in fact it flows up through 
the casing and is discharged into Fairfield's ditches 
for its use. Fairfield says it can get to the crux of 
the matter by looking to the irrigation season of 1969, 
and then for the convenience of the Court reproduces 
and includes in its Brief a part of one of its graphs 
which is in evidence. It then erroneously asserts that 
White took that quantity of water represented by 
the shaded part of the graph. 
16 
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Thus, Fairfield would have this Court believe 
that the fluctuations appearing on its reproduced 
graph on page 7 of its Brief were all caused by the 
pumping of White's well. The facts are as related by 
Fairfield's own witness Lawrence, that when the wa-
ter is backed up in the spring area to force the water 
into Fairfield's ditches the discharge of the spring is 
reduced. Likewise, when the water is turned from 
one ditch to another (marked by red and blue vertical 
lines on Exhibit 2) there are fluctuations in the 
measured flow of the discharge of the Fairfield 
Springs. Thus the decrease in the measured dis-
charge of the Fairfield Springs from May 1 to May 
2, 1969, as shown by Fairfield's graph, coincided 
with a change from one ditch to the other (Exh· 2). 
The same is true for the decreases on May 12, May 
26, June 9 and June 21, 1969. As a matter of fact, 
White did not even operate his well during the en-
tire month of June, 1969 yet the fluctuations still oc-
curred, and notably the decrease on June 9. Any re-
duction in flow resulting from changing from one 
ditch to the other or backing the water up over the 
springs cannot be attributable to White's well. 
Fairfield repeatedly argues that the Decree does 
not permit White to take "their water" in June and 
replace it in October, as if that were the fact. Fair-
field suggests that White purposely manipulates his 
well to accomplish that result, which is simply not 
borne out by the evidence. It picks the year 1969 to 
complain about White's pumping because it suits its 
17 
purposes, but it ignores the years 1968 and 1970. 
The facts are that White pumped the one well during 
parts of all of the months from May through Novem-
ber of 1968, did not pump in June, 1969, but did pump 
during each of the months of May, July, August, Sep-
tember, October and November of 1969. Likewise 
in 1970 White pumped during the months of May, 
June, July and August. It can hardly be said there-
from that Fairfield's argument finds any support in 
the evidence. In fact, Fairfield's own witness Law-
rence was unable to tell one way or the other from the 
hydrograph of the discharge of the Fairfield Springs 
during the months of June and July, 1970 whether 
the White well was then being pumped (Tr. 33, 34). 
After all is said and done, the facts still remain , 
that during each year when White has pumped his 
well since the entry of the 1965 Decree the Fairfield 
Springs, as augmented by the 0.12 cfs of replacement 
water, has remained above 4.1 cfs and Fairfield has 
received at least 1600 acre feet of water during each 
irrigation season. As such White has fully complied 
with the conditions of paragraph 4 (a) of the 1965 De-
cree. The lower court expressly found that White did 
not violate the 1965 Decree. Under the cardinal rules 
of review, that Finding is presumed to be valid and 
correct by this Court and it is Fairfield's burden here 
to show error. This Fairfield has wholly failed to do. 
The record in this case must be reviewed in the light 
most favorable to such Finding and should not be dis-
turbed since the evidence clearly supports it. Charl-
ton v. Hackett, supra. 
18 
---
Fairfield seeks on this appeal to reverse the re-
fusal of the trial court to find that White violated the 
1965 Decree. The correct rule here is that this Court 
should not upset the trial court's refusal to so find 
unless the evidence is such that all reasonable minds 
would so conclude and thus compel such a finding. 
Park v. Alta Ditch & Canal Company, 23 Utah 2d 86, 
458 P.2d 625 (1969). Under the record of this case 
it would be absurd to say that the evidence compels 
such a finding. Accordingly, the Order of the trial 
court must in all respects be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH NOV AK 
Attorney for 
defendant and respondent 
M. Kenneth White 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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